Optimal Insurance: Dual Utility, Random Losses, and Adverse Selection
American Economic Review · 01.10.2023 · 113 (10) · 2581-2614
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20221247 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Review, erschienen am 01.10.2023. Verfasst von Alex Gershkov und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 16-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 75 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study a generalization of the classical monopoly insurance problem under adverse selection (see Stiglitz 1977) where we allow for a random distribution of losses, possibly correlated with the agent’s risk parameter that is private information. Our model explains patterns of observed customer behavior and predicts insurance contracts most often observed in practice: these consist of menus of several deductible-premium pairs or menus of insurance with coverage limits–premium pairs. A main departure from the classical insurance literature is obtained here by endowing the agents with risk-averse preferences that can be represented by a dual utility functional (Yaari 1987). (JEL D81, D82, D86, D91, G22)
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APA
Gershkov, A., Moldovanu, B., Strack, P., & Zhang, M. (2023). Optimal Insurance: Dual Utility, Random Losses, and Adverse Selection. American Economic Review, 113(10), 2581-2614. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20221247
Vancouver
Gershkov A, Moldovanu B, Strack P, Zhang M. Optimal Insurance: Dual Utility, Random Losses, and Adverse Selection. American Economic Review. 2023;113(10):2581-2614. doi:10.1257/aer.20221247
BibTeX
@article{Gershkov2023,
author = {Gershkov, Alex and Moldovanu, Benny and Strack, Philipp and Zhang, Mengxi},
title = {Optimal Insurance: Dual Utility, Random Losses, and Adverse Selection},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = {2023},
volume = {113},
number = {10},
pages = {2581--2614},
doi = {10.1257/aer.20221247}
}
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