Ratings design and barriers to entry
Theoretical Economics · 2026 · 21 (3) · 775-809
DOI: 10.3982/te6338 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Theoretical Economics, 2026. Written by Nikhil Vellodi. 32 references. The full text is freely available (open access, CC BY-NC 4.0). Funded by: Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam.
Abstract (original language)
I study the impact of consumer reviews on the incentives for firms to participate in the market. I develop a model of endogenous entry in which firms produce goods of heterogeneous, unknown quality. Consumers engage in directed search, and prices are exogenously fixed. A rater uses consumer reviews to construct firm‐specific ratings that are informative of quality and help consumers direct their search. The main insight of the paper is that suppressing the reviews of highly‐rated firms strengthens entry incentives and improves consumer welfare.
Funding
- Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
Cite
APA
Vellodi, N. (2026). Ratings design and barriers to entry. Theoretical Economics, 21(3), 775-809. https://doi.org/10.3982/te6338
Vancouver
Vellodi N. Ratings design and barriers to entry. Theoretical Economics. 2026;21(3):775-809. doi:10.3982/te6338
BibTeX
@article{Vellodi2026,
author = {Vellodi, Nikhil},
title = {Ratings design and barriers to entry},
journal = {Theoretical Economics},
year = {2026},
volume = {21},
number = {3},
pages = {775--809},
doi = {10.3982/te6338}
}
EUVIMED