Information design in smooth games
Theoretical Economics · 2026 · 21 (4) · 1370-1414
DOI: 10.3982/te6143 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Theoretical Economics, 2026. Verfasst von Alex Smolin und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 67 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0). Gefördert von: Agence Nationale de la Recherche, HORIZON EUROPE European Research Council, Horizon 2020 Framework Programme.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study information design in games where players choose from a continuum of actions and have continuously differentiable payoffs. We show that an information structure is optimal when the equilibrium it induces can also be implemented in a principal–agent contracting problem. Building on this result, we characterize optimal information structures in symmetric linear‐quadratic games. With common values, targeted disclosure is robustly optimal across all priors. With interdependent and normally distributed values, linear disclosure is uniquely optimal. We illustrate our findings with applications in venture capital, Bayesian polarization, and price competition.
Förderung
- Agence Nationale de la Recherche
- HORIZON EUROPE European Research Council
- Horizon 2020 Framework Programme
- Japan Society for the Promotion of Science
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APA
Smolin, A., & Yamashita, T. (2026). Information design in smooth games. Theoretical Economics, 21(4), 1370-1414. https://doi.org/10.3982/te6143
Vancouver
Smolin A, Yamashita T. Information design in smooth games. Theoretical Economics. 2026;21(4):1370-1414. doi:10.3982/te6143
BibTeX
@article{Smolin2026,
author = {Smolin, Alex and Yamashita, Takuro},
title = {Information design in smooth games},
journal = {Theoretical Economics},
year = {2026},
volume = {21},
number = {4},
pages = {1370--1414},
doi = {10.3982/te6143}
}
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