A theory of fair random allocation under priorities
Theoretical Economics · 2024 · 19 (3) · 1185-1221
DOI: 10.3982/te5262 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Theoretical Economics, 2024. Written by Xiang Han. Cited 8 times so far (Crossref); 46 references. The full text is freely available (open access, CC BY-NC 4.0). Funded by: National Natural Science Foundation of China.
Abstract (original language)
In the allocation of indivisible objects under weak priorities, a common practice is to break the ties using a lottery and to randomize over deterministic mechanisms. Such randomizations usually lead to unfairness and inefficiency ex ante. We propose and study the concept of ex ante fairness for random allocations, extending some key results in the one‐sided and two‐sided matching markets. It is shown that the set of ex ante fair random allocations forms a complete and distributive lattice under first‐order stochastic‐dominance relations, and the agent‐optimal ex ante fair mechanism includes both the deferred acceptance algorithm and the probabilistic serial mechanism as special cases. Instead of randomizing over deterministic mechanisms, our mechanism is constructed using the division method, a new general way to construct random mechanisms from deterministic mechanisms. As additional applications, we demonstrate that several previous extensions of the probabilistic serial mechanism have their foundations in existing deterministic mechanisms.
Funding
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
Cite
APA
Han, X. (2024). A theory of fair random allocation under priorities. Theoretical Economics, 19(3), 1185-1221. https://doi.org/10.3982/te5262
Vancouver
Han X. A theory of fair random allocation under priorities. Theoretical Economics. 2024;19(3):1185-1221. doi:10.3982/te5262
BibTeX
@article{Han2024,
author = {Han, Xiang},
title = {A theory of fair random allocation under priorities},
journal = {Theoretical Economics},
year = {2024},
volume = {19},
number = {3},
pages = {1185--1221},
doi = {10.3982/te5262}
}
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