Relational enforcement
Theoretical Economics · 2024 · 19 (2) · 823-863
DOI: 10.3982/te5183 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Theoretical Economics, 2024. Written by Peter Achim and 1 co-authors. Cited 8 times so far (Crossref); 42 references. The full text is freely available (open access, CC BY-NC 4.0). Funded by: City of Vancouver, University of California Berkeley, Hausdorff Center for Mathematics.
Abstract (original language)
A principal incentivizes an agent to maintain compliance and to truthfully announce any breaches of compliance. Compliance is imperfectly controlled by the agent's private effort choices, is partially persistent, and is verifiable by the principal only through costly inspections. We show that in principal‐optimal equilibria, the principal enforces maximum compliance using deterministic inspections. Periodic inspection cycles are suspended during periods of self‐reported noncompliance, during which the agent is fined. We show how commitment to random inspections would benefit the principal, and discuss possible ways for the principal to overcome her commitment problem.
Funding
- City of Vancouver
- University of California Berkeley
- Hausdorff Center for Mathematics
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
- Academy of Finland
Cite
APA
Achim, P., & Knoepfle, J. (2024). Relational enforcement. Theoretical Economics, 19(2), 823-863. https://doi.org/10.3982/te5183
Vancouver
Achim P, Knoepfle J. Relational enforcement. Theoretical Economics. 2024;19(2):823-863. doi:10.3982/te5183
BibTeX
@article{Achim2024,
author = {Achim, Peter and Knoepfle, Jan},
title = {Relational enforcement},
journal = {Theoretical Economics},
year = {2024},
volume = {19},
number = {2},
pages = {823--863},
doi = {10.3982/te5183}
}
EUVIMED