Relational enforcement
Theoretical Economics · 2024 · 19 (2) · 823-863
DOI: 10.3982/te5183 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Theoretical Economics, 2024. Verfasst von Peter Achim und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 8-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 42 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0). Gefördert von: City of Vancouver, University of California Berkeley, Hausdorff Center for Mathematics.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
A principal incentivizes an agent to maintain compliance and to truthfully announce any breaches of compliance. Compliance is imperfectly controlled by the agent's private effort choices, is partially persistent, and is verifiable by the principal only through costly inspections. We show that in principal‐optimal equilibria, the principal enforces maximum compliance using deterministic inspections. Periodic inspection cycles are suspended during periods of self‐reported noncompliance, during which the agent is fined. We show how commitment to random inspections would benefit the principal, and discuss possible ways for the principal to overcome her commitment problem.
Förderung
- City of Vancouver
- University of California Berkeley
- Hausdorff Center for Mathematics
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
- Academy of Finland
Zitieren
APA
Achim, P., & Knoepfle, J. (2024). Relational enforcement. Theoretical Economics, 19(2), 823-863. https://doi.org/10.3982/te5183
Vancouver
Achim P, Knoepfle J. Relational enforcement. Theoretical Economics. 2024;19(2):823-863. doi:10.3982/te5183
BibTeX
@article{Achim2024,
author = {Achim, Peter and Knoepfle, Jan},
title = {Relational enforcement},
journal = {Theoretical Economics},
year = {2024},
volume = {19},
number = {2},
pages = {823--863},
doi = {10.3982/te5183}
}
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