Information design in multistage games
Theoretical Economics · 2023 · 18 (4) · 1475-1509
DOI: 10.3982/te4769 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Theoretical Economics, 2023. Verfasst von Miltiadis Makris und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 20-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 27 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper generalizes the concept of Bayes' correlated equilibrium Bergemann and Morris (2016) to multistage games. We apply our characterization results to a number of illustrative examples and applications.
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APA
Makris, M., & Renou, L. (2023). Information design in multistage games. Theoretical Economics, 18(4), 1475-1509. https://doi.org/10.3982/te4769
Vancouver
Makris M, Renou L. Information design in multistage games. Theoretical Economics. 2023;18(4):1475-1509. doi:10.3982/te4769
BibTeX
@article{Makris2023,
author = {Makris, Miltiadis and Renou, Ludovic},
title = {Information design in multistage games},
journal = {Theoretical Economics},
year = {2023},
volume = {18},
number = {4},
pages = {1475--1509},
doi = {10.3982/te4769}
}
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