Mislearning from censored data: The gambler's fallacy and other correlational mistakes in optimal‐stopping problems
Theoretical Economics · 2022 · 17 (3) · 1269-1312
DOI: 10.3982/te4657 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Theoretical Economics, 2022. Written by Kevin He. Cited 14 times so far (Crossref); 45 references. The full text is freely available (open access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (original language)
I study endogenous learning dynamics for people who misperceive intertemporal correlations in random sequences. Biased agents face an optimal‐stopping problem. They are uncertain about the underlying distribution and learn its parameters from predecessors. Agents stop when early draws are “good enough,” so predecessors' experiences contain negative streaks but not positive streaks. When agents wrongly expect systematic reversals (the “gambler's fallacy”), they understate the likelihood of consecutive below‐average draws, converge to overpessimistic beliefs about the distribution's mean, and stop too early. Agents uncertain about the distribution's variance overestimate it to an extent that depends on predecessors' stopping thresholds. I also analyze how other misperceptions of intertemporal correlation interact with endogenous data censoring.
Cite
APA
He, K. (2022). Mislearning from censored data: The gambler's fallacy and other correlational mistakes in optimal‐stopping problems. Theoretical Economics, 17(3), 1269-1312. https://doi.org/10.3982/te4657
Vancouver
He K. Mislearning from censored data: The gambler's fallacy and other correlational mistakes in optimal‐stopping problems. Theoretical Economics. 2022;17(3):1269-1312. doi:10.3982/te4657
BibTeX
@article{He2022,
author = {He, Kevin},
title = {Mislearning from censored data: The gambler's fallacy and other correlational mistakes in optimal‐stopping problems},
journal = {Theoretical Economics},
year = {2022},
volume = {17},
number = {3},
pages = {1269--1312},
doi = {10.3982/te4657}
}
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