Mislearning from censored data: The gambler's fallacy and other correlational mistakes in optimal‐stopping problems
Theoretical Economics · 2022 · 17 (3) · 1269-1312
DOI: 10.3982/te4657 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Theoretical Economics, 2022. Verfasst von Kevin He. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 14-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 45 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
I study endogenous learning dynamics for people who misperceive intertemporal correlations in random sequences. Biased agents face an optimal‐stopping problem. They are uncertain about the underlying distribution and learn its parameters from predecessors. Agents stop when early draws are “good enough,” so predecessors' experiences contain negative streaks but not positive streaks. When agents wrongly expect systematic reversals (the “gambler's fallacy”), they understate the likelihood of consecutive below‐average draws, converge to overpessimistic beliefs about the distribution's mean, and stop too early. Agents uncertain about the distribution's variance overestimate it to an extent that depends on predecessors' stopping thresholds. I also analyze how other misperceptions of intertemporal correlation interact with endogenous data censoring.
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APA
He, K. (2022). Mislearning from censored data: The gambler's fallacy and other correlational mistakes in optimal‐stopping problems. Theoretical Economics, 17(3), 1269-1312. https://doi.org/10.3982/te4657
Vancouver
He K. Mislearning from censored data: The gambler's fallacy and other correlational mistakes in optimal‐stopping problems. Theoretical Economics. 2022;17(3):1269-1312. doi:10.3982/te4657
BibTeX
@article{He2022,
author = {He, Kevin},
title = {Mislearning from censored data: The gambler's fallacy and other correlational mistakes in optimal‐stopping problems},
journal = {Theoretical Economics},
year = {2022},
volume = {17},
number = {3},
pages = {1269--1312},
doi = {10.3982/te4657}
}
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