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Open access · CC BY-NC 4.0

Censorship as optimal persuasion

Anton Kolotilin, Timofiy Mylovanov, Andriy Zapechelnyuk

Theoretical Economics · 2022 · 17 (2) · 561-585

DOI: 10.3982/te4071 ↗

At a glance

Journal article in Theoretical Economics, 2022. Written by Anton Kolotilin and 2 co-authors. Cited 48 times so far (Crossref); 41 references. The full text is freely available (open access, CC BY-NC 4.0). Funded by: Australian Research Council, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Office of Naval Research.

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Abstract (original language)

We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where a sender's utility depends only on the expected state. We show that upper censorship that pools the states above a cutoff and reveals the states below the cutoff is optimal for all prior distributions of the state if and only if the sender's marginal utility is quasi‐concave. Moreover, we show that it is optimal to reveal less information if the sender becomes more risk averse or the sender's utility shifts to the left. Finally, we apply our results to the problem of media censorship by a government.

Funding

  • Australian Research Council
  • Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • Office of Naval Research
  • Economic and Social Research Council

Cite

APA

Kolotilin, A., Mylovanov, T., & Zapechelnyuk, A. (2022). Censorship as optimal persuasion. Theoretical Economics, 17(2), 561-585. https://doi.org/10.3982/te4071

Vancouver

Kolotilin A, Mylovanov T, Zapechelnyuk A. Censorship as optimal persuasion. Theoretical Economics. 2022;17(2):561-585. doi:10.3982/te4071

BibTeX
@article{Kolotilin2022,
  author = {Kolotilin, Anton and Mylovanov, Timofiy and Zapechelnyuk, Andriy},
  title = {Censorship as optimal persuasion},
  journal = {Theoretical Economics},
  year = {2022},
  volume = {17},
  number = {2},
  pages = {561--585},
  doi = {10.3982/te4071}
}
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