Censorship as optimal persuasion
Theoretical Economics · 2022 · 17 (2) · 561-585
DOI: 10.3982/te4071 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Theoretical Economics, 2022. Verfasst von Anton Kolotilin und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 48-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 41 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0). Gefördert von: Australian Research Council, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Office of Naval Research.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where a sender's utility depends only on the expected state. We show that upper censorship that pools the states above a cutoff and reveals the states below the cutoff is optimal for all prior distributions of the state if and only if the sender's marginal utility is quasi‐concave. Moreover, we show that it is optimal to reveal less information if the sender becomes more risk averse or the sender's utility shifts to the left. Finally, we apply our results to the problem of media censorship by a government.
Förderung
- Australian Research Council
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- Office of Naval Research
- Economic and Social Research Council
Zitieren
APA
Kolotilin, A., Mylovanov, T., & Zapechelnyuk, A. (2022). Censorship as optimal persuasion. Theoretical Economics, 17(2), 561-585. https://doi.org/10.3982/te4071
Vancouver
Kolotilin A, Mylovanov T, Zapechelnyuk A. Censorship as optimal persuasion. Theoretical Economics. 2022;17(2):561-585. doi:10.3982/te4071
BibTeX
@article{Kolotilin2022,
author = {Kolotilin, Anton and Mylovanov, Timofiy and Zapechelnyuk, Andriy},
title = {Censorship as optimal persuasion},
journal = {Theoretical Economics},
year = {2022},
volume = {17},
number = {2},
pages = {561--585},
doi = {10.3982/te4071}
}
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