School choice, skill measures, and graduation
Quantitative Economics · 2026 · 17 (4) · 939-969
DOI: 10.3982/qe2826 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Quantitative Economics, 2026. Verfasst von María Elena Ortega-Hesles und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 63 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper studies the effects of combining skill measures to construct the priority order in a centralized education market. We use data from Mexico City, where seat rationing relies solely on a one‐shot exam score. We first show that admission to the most oversubscribed schools decreases graduation among marginally admitted students, but this effect is heterogeneous. It decreases with the one‐shot exam score among inframarginal students and is negative for marginal students with low GPAs but null for those with high GPAs. We then use a model of school choice and graduation to study the equity and efficiency of counterfactual priority orders that combine the one‐shot exam score and GPA. Greater weight on GPA increases access to the most oversubscribed schools for girls and low‐SES students. However, assigning roughly equal weight to both skill measures maximizes their graduation rates at these schools.
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APA
Ortega-Hesles, M. E., & Pariguana, M. (2026). School choice, skill measures, and graduation. Quantitative Economics, 17(4), 939-969. https://doi.org/10.3982/qe2826
Vancouver
Ortega-Hesles ME, Pariguana M. School choice, skill measures, and graduation. Quantitative Economics. 2026;17(4):939-969. doi:10.3982/qe2826
BibTeX
@article{OrtegaHesles2026,
author = {Ortega-Hesles, María Elena and Pariguana, Marco},
title = {School choice, skill measures, and graduation},
journal = {Quantitative Economics},
year = {2026},
volume = {17},
number = {4},
pages = {939--969},
doi = {10.3982/qe2826}
}
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