Purchasing seats in school choice and inequality
Quantitative Economics · 2024 · 15 (4) · 1151-1195
DOI: 10.3982/qe2220 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Quantitative Economics, 2024. Verfasst von Tong Wang und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 62 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study a mechanism that gives students the option of paying higher tuition to attend their preferred schools. This seat‐purchasing mechanism is neither strategyproof nor stable. Our paper combines administrative and survey data to estimate students' preferences and conducts welfare analysis. We find that changing from a deferred acceptance mechanism to the cadet‐optimal stable mechanism reduces students' welfare but that adopting the observed seat‐purchasing mechanism alleviates this welfare loss. Moreover, students from affluent communities prefer to pay higher tuition to stay at preferred schools, while those from less affluent communities are more likely be priced out to lower‐quality schools.
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APA
Wang, T., & Zhou, C. (2024). Purchasing seats in school choice and inequality. Quantitative Economics, 15(4), 1151-1195. https://doi.org/10.3982/qe2220
Vancouver
Wang T, Zhou C. Purchasing seats in school choice and inequality. Quantitative Economics. 2024;15(4):1151-1195. doi:10.3982/qe2220
BibTeX
@article{Wang2024,
author = {Wang, Tong and Zhou, Congyi},
title = {Purchasing seats in school choice and inequality},
journal = {Quantitative Economics},
year = {2024},
volume = {15},
number = {4},
pages = {1151--1195},
doi = {10.3982/qe2220}
}
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