Dynamic Screening of Buyers With Heterogeneous Purchase Frequency
Econometrica · 2026 · 94 (4) · 1245-1278
DOI: 10.3982/ecta23049 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Econometrica, 2026. Written by Johannes Hörner and 1 co-authors. Cited 1 times so far (Crossref); 47 references. Funded by: Agence Nationale de la Recherche.
Abstract (original language)
We consider a dynamic buyer–seller interaction. Instead of the buyer's valuation, it is the frequency with which he needs to trade that is the buyer's private information. The difference matters. With commitment, full surplus extraction is possible, for instance via limited‐time offers. Without commitment, ratcheting is mitigated, as not buying is not necessarily a sign of strength. Because time is informative, the seller learns and may adjust her behavior over time. When finding a suitable alternative seller is easy, she starts with a pooling offer before permanently switching to a screening offer. When finding a suitable alternative seller takes time, she starts with a pooling offer before occasionally experimenting with separating offers.
Funding
- Agence Nationale de la Recherche
Cite
APA
Hörner, J., & Sanktjohanser, A. (2026). Dynamic Screening of Buyers With Heterogeneous Purchase Frequency. Econometrica, 94(4), 1245-1278. https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta23049
Vancouver
Hörner J, Sanktjohanser A. Dynamic Screening of Buyers With Heterogeneous Purchase Frequency. Econometrica. 2026;94(4):1245-1278. doi:10.3982/ecta23049
BibTeX
@article{Hrner2026,
author = {Hörner, Johannes and Sanktjohanser, Anna},
title = {Dynamic Screening of Buyers With Heterogeneous Purchase Frequency},
journal = {Econometrica},
year = {2026},
volume = {94},
number = {4},
pages = {1245--1278},
doi = {10.3982/ecta23049}
}
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