Crossref
Employment Effect of Sticky Wage When Effort Can Respond: Taylor-type Staggering Wage Contract
Journal of Market Economy · 2018
DOI: 10.38162/jome.47.1.2 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Market Economy, 2018. Verfasst von Yongsung Chang und 1 weiteren Autor:innen.
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APA
Chang, Y., & Kim, S. (2018). Employment Effect of Sticky Wage When Effort Can Respond: Taylor-type Staggering Wage Contract. Journal of Market Economy. https://doi.org/10.38162/jome.47.1.2
Vancouver
Chang Y, Kim S. Employment Effect of Sticky Wage When Effort Can Respond: Taylor-type Staggering Wage Contract. Journal of Market Economy. 2018. doi:10.38162/jome.47.1.2
BibTeX
@article{Chang2018,
author = {Chang, Yongsung and Kim, Sunbin},
title = {Employment Effect of Sticky Wage When Effort Can Respond: Taylor-type Staggering Wage Contract},
journal = {Journal of Market Economy},
year = {2018},
doi = {10.38162/jome.47.1.2}
}
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