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Ambiguous Sticks and Carrots: The Effect of Contract Framing and Payoff Ambiguity on Employee Effort

Joseph Burke, Kristy L. Towry, Donald Young, Jacob Zureich

The Accounting Review · 01.01.2023 · 98 (1) · 139-162

DOI: 10.2308/tar-2021-0345 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Accounting Review, online erschienen am 18.01.2023. Verfasst von Joseph Burke und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 14-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 64 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Research suggests that employees work harder under penalty contracts than under economically equivalent bonus contracts. We build on this literature by examining how the motivational advantage of penalty contracts depends on a common aspect of real-world contracts: payoff ambiguity. With payoff ambiguity, employees provide effort without knowing how much pay they will receive for a given level of performance. According to our theory, this ambiguity opens the door for employee optimism, which has contrasting effects under each contract frame. Results from an experiment support this theory, with an increase in ambiguity leading to less employee effort with penalty contracts (as employees optimistically expect small penalties) and more effort with bonus contracts (as employees optimistically expect large bonuses). We also find that these effects are stronger for more dispositionally optimistic employees. Overall, our results suggest that bonus contracts may be more motivating and penalty contracts less motivating than previously thought.

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APA

Burke, J., Towry, K. L., Young, D., & Zureich, J. (2023). Ambiguous Sticks and Carrots: The Effect of Contract Framing and Payoff Ambiguity on Employee Effort. The Accounting Review, 98(1), 139-162. https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2021-0345

Vancouver

Burke J, Towry KL, Young D, Zureich J. Ambiguous Sticks and Carrots: The Effect of Contract Framing and Payoff Ambiguity on Employee Effort. The Accounting Review. 2023;98(1):139-162. doi:10.2308/tar-2021-0345

BibTeX
@article{Burke2023,
  author = {Burke, Joseph and Towry, Kristy L. and Young, Donald and Zureich, Jacob},
  title = {Ambiguous Sticks and Carrots: The Effect of Contract Framing and Payoff Ambiguity on Employee Effort},
  journal = {The Accounting Review},
  year = {2023},
  volume = {98},
  number = {1},
  pages = {139--162},
  doi = {10.2308/tar-2021-0345}
}
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