Commonsensical Animal Law
DALPS (Derecho Animal-Animal Legal and Policy Studies) · 2026-06-24 · 4 · 748-785
DOI: 10.36151/dalps.116 ↗At a glance
Journal article in DALPS (Derecho Animal-Animal Legal and Policy Studies), published online on 2026-06-24. Written by Hassan Jafaritabar. The full text is freely available (open access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (original language)
Animal rights are presented here not merely as scientific or philosophical questions, but as matters of ordinary human common sense responding to animal sentience. That perspective is developed through abductive, commonsense reasoning rather than through deduction or induction. As a result, the law tends to protect dogs, primates, and other animals whose suffering is readily and vividly perceived by humans, whilst the legal status of insects remains comparatively fragile. Common sense responds most readily to animals that possess what this article calls a vivid soul—a presence felt most strongly where animals confront humans with a face and eyes that can meet the human gaze. On this account, soul is a fuzzy phenomenon that admits of degrees. The proper function of law, therefore, is not to maximise welfare, but to minimise the pain that humans inflict. Since animals cannot litigate in their own name, the article argues that their rights should, where necessary, be enforced through noncontentious procedures, enabling courts to act without the machinery of ordinary adversarial litigation.
Cite
APA
Jafaritabar, H. (2026). Commonsensical Animal Law. DALPS (Derecho Animal-Animal Legal and Policy Studies), 4, 748-785. https://doi.org/10.36151/dalps.116
Vancouver
Jafaritabar H. Commonsensical Animal Law. DALPS (Derecho Animal-Animal Legal and Policy Studies). 2026;4:748-785. doi:10.36151/dalps.116
BibTeX
@article{Jafaritabar2026,
author = {Jafaritabar, Hassan},
title = {Commonsensical Animal Law},
journal = {DALPS (Derecho Animal-Animal Legal and Policy Studies)},
year = {2026},
volume = {4},
pages = {748--785},
doi = {10.36151/dalps.116}
}
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