When Fail-Secure Is Not Fail-Safe: Parser Safety in S-100 Maritime Navigation
Sensors · 12.10.2026 · 26 (20) · 6448
DOI: 10.3390/s26206448 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Sensors, online erschienen am 12.10.2026. Verfasst von Hoyeon Cho und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Division of Maritime Information Technology, National Korea Maritime and Ocean University, Busan 49112, Republic of Korea. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 37 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Ministry of Education (MOE) and the Busan Metropolitan City, Republic of Korea.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Safety-critical maritime navigation depends on machine-readable data products. Their digital signatures establish provenance and integrity but do not guarantee that authenticated content can be parsed safely: even passive data containing no executable code can drive allocation through file-supplied metadata. Using OpenS100, an open S-100 reference implementation, this paper asks whether passive S-102 products can compromise parser memory safety and whether operating system protection alone preserves availability. This paper analyzed the S-102 bathymetric surface specification, built a structurally valid proof-of-concept file with inconsistent grid metadata, and ran it under strong and weak operating system protection across repeated trials. The file triggered an integer overflow and heap buffer overflow without an executable payload. Under strong memory protection, no tested exploit achieved code execution; process termination dominated and the base trigger produced deterministic denial of service, a Fail-Secure outcome that still removed the navigation display. Under weak protection, existing-function reuse achieved Arbitrary Code Execution (ACE) in 14 of 200 launches (7.0%). Neither preserved safe-navigation continuity in the tested application. A four-layer application-level validation sequence applied before allocation prevented both, with no workload-dominant overhead in three desktop microbenchmarks. Passive data are therefore security-relevant parser inputs; preserving both security and availability requires validation before corruption occurs.
Schlagwörter
Stichwörter der Autor:innen
Autor:innen und Institutionen
- Division of Maritime Information Technology, National Korea Maritime and Ocean University, Busan 49112, Republic of Korea.
- Division of Marine System Engineering, National Korea Maritime and Ocean University, Busan 49112, Republic of Korea.
ORCID-Profile: Hoyeon Cho, Seojeong Lee, Changui Lee
Förderung
- Ministry of Education (MOE) and the Busan Metropolitan City, Republic of Korea
Zitieren
APA
Cho, H., Lee, S., & Lee, C. (2026). When Fail-Secure Is Not Fail-Safe: Parser Safety in S-100 Maritime Navigation. Sensors, 26(20), 6448. https://doi.org/10.3390/s26206448
Vancouver
Cho H, Lee S, Lee C. When Fail-Secure Is Not Fail-Safe: Parser Safety in S-100 Maritime Navigation. Sensors. 2026;26(20):6448. doi:10.3390/s26206448
BibTeX
@article{Cho2026,
author = {Cho, Hoyeon and Lee, Seojeong and Lee, Changui},
title = {When Fail-Secure Is Not Fail-Safe: Parser Safety in S-100 Maritime Navigation},
journal = {Sensors},
year = {2026},
volume = {26},
number = {20},
pages = {6448},
doi = {10.3390/s26206448}
}
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