Analysis of Security Vulnerabilities in S-100-Based Maritime Navigation Software
Sensors · 14.02.2026 · 26 (4) · 1246
DOI: 10.3390/s26041246 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Sensors, online erschienen am 14.02.2026. Verfasst von Hoyeon Cho und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Division of Maritime Information Technology, National Korea Maritime and Ocean University, Busan 49112, Republic of Korea. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 5-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 38 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Ministry of Education and Busan Metropolitan City through the Busan Regional Innovation System & Education (RISE) Project, Ministry of Education and Busan Metropolitan City through the Busan Regional Innovation System & Education (RISE) Project.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The S-100 standard for Electronic Chart Display and Information Systems (ECDIS) uses Lua scripts to render electronic charts, yet lacks security specifications for script execution. This paper evaluates automated Static Application Security Testing (SAST) tools versus expert manual review for S-100-compliant software. Four SAST tools were applied alongside an expert review of OpenS100, a reference implementation for next-generation ECDIS. While automated tools identified numerous defects, they failed to detect 83% (19/23) of expert-identified vulnerabilities, including an unrestricted Lua interpreter flaw with a Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) score of 9.3. This vulnerability enables Remote Code Execution (RCE) via malicious portrayal catalogues, verified through Proof of Concept (PoC) development. The analysis demonstrates that SAST tools are constrained by limited maritime domain knowledge and challenges in analyzing cross-language semantic risks at the C++–Lua interface. The findings establish that identified vulnerabilities stem from specification gaps in the S-100 standard rather than isolated coding errors. These results indicate that functional safety certifications require supplementation to address design-level security risks. The evidence supports that the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) incorporate security controls, such as script sandboxing and library restrictions, into the S-100 framework before the 2029 mandatory adoption deadline.
Schlagwörter
Stichwörter der Autor:innen
Autor:innen und Institutionen
- Division of Maritime Information Technology, National Korea Maritime and Ocean University, Busan 49112, Republic of Korea.
- SemanticWave, Busan 47257, Republic of Korea.
- Division of Marine System Engineering, National Korea Maritime and Ocean University, Busan 49112, Republic of Korea.
ORCID-Profile: Hoyeon Cho, Changui Lee, Seojeong Lee
Förderung
- Ministry of Education and Busan Metropolitan City through the Busan Regional Innovation System & Education (RISE) Project
- Ministry of Education and Busan Metropolitan City through the Busan Regional Innovation System & Education (RISE) Project
Zitieren
APA
Cho, H., Lee, C., & Lee, S. (2026). Analysis of Security Vulnerabilities in S-100-Based Maritime Navigation Software. Sensors, 26(4), 1246. https://doi.org/10.3390/s26041246
Vancouver
Cho H, Lee C, Lee S. Analysis of Security Vulnerabilities in S-100-Based Maritime Navigation Software. Sensors. 2026;26(4):1246. doi:10.3390/s26041246
BibTeX
@article{Cho2026,
author = {Cho, Hoyeon and Lee, Changui and Lee, Seojeong},
title = {Analysis of Security Vulnerabilities in S-100-Based Maritime Navigation Software},
journal = {Sensors},
year = {2026},
volume = {26},
number = {4},
pages = {1246},
doi = {10.3390/s26041246}
}
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