Bank vs. Trade Credit Financing for Emission Reduction: The Role of Retailer Information Disclosure
Mathematics · 2026-06-28 · 14 (13) · 2292
DOI: 10.3390/math14132292 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Mathematics, published online on 2026-06-28. Written by Jing Xia and 1 co-authors. 36 references. The full text is freely available (open access, CC BY 4.0). Funded by: National Natural Science Foundation of China.
Abstract (original language)
This study constructs a Stackelberg game model for a supply chain comprising a capital-constrained manufacturer and a retailer with private demand information to analyze the interplay between the manufacturer’s carbon abatement financing strategy (bank credit vs. trade credit) and the retailer’s information sharing decision. The results show that the impact of information sharing is contingent on market sentiment. Sharing is beneficial, promoting abatement investment and supply chain performance under optimistic market forecasts, but it can suppress investment and increase emissions under pessimistic ones. Furthermore, the manufacturer’s financing choice is driven by the investment cost and carbon price; trade credit becomes more attractive for emission reduction as investment costs decrease and carbon prices rise. Counter-intuitively, higher forecast accuracy does not always incentivize information sharing, with its effects on disclosure and environmental performance exhibiting distinct threshold characteristics.
Funding
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
Cite
APA
Xia, J., & Liu, Y. (2026). Bank vs. Trade Credit Financing for Emission Reduction: The Role of Retailer Information Disclosure. Mathematics, 14(13), 2292. https://doi.org/10.3390/math14132292
Vancouver
Xia J, Liu Y. Bank vs. Trade Credit Financing for Emission Reduction: The Role of Retailer Information Disclosure. Mathematics. 2026;14(13):2292. doi:10.3390/math14132292
BibTeX
@article{Xia2026,
author = {Xia, Jing and Liu, Yifei},
title = {Bank vs. Trade Credit Financing for Emission Reduction: The Role of Retailer Information Disclosure},
journal = {Mathematics},
year = {2026},
volume = {14},
number = {13},
pages = {2292},
doi = {10.3390/math14132292}
}
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