Manufacturer Encroachment on a Sustainable Supply Chain under Asymmetric Green Information
Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research · 26.08.2024 · 19 (3) · 2114-2138
DOI: 10.3390/jtaer19030103 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research, online erschienen am 26.08.2024. Verfasst von Yufei Hu und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 4-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 56 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper investigates manufacturer encroachment on a sustainable supply chain, where the manufacturer holds exclusive information on product greenness and is responsible for both corporate social responsibility (CSR) and greening. The manufacturer and the retailer play a signaling game whereby CSR effort and wholesale price serve as joint green signals. Findings reveal that, firstly, encroachment induces higher CSR efforts from manufacturers. When customers exhibit a strong CSR preference, the resulting CSR increment leads to increased offline demand and drives up both wholesale and retail prices in a mutually beneficial manner. This phenomenon is referred to as the CSR effect, yielding a win-win encroachment. Secondly, when signaling product greenness to highly CSR-sensitive customers, the high-greenness manufacturer principally distorts her CSR effort downward to an extent unprofitable for the low-greenness manufacturer to mimic and subordinately distorts the wholesale price downward to counter CSR-induced demand decrement and mitigate CSR cost pass-through downstream. Finally, the win-win encroachment pattern is characterized by encroachment profit and signal expense sharing, with encroachment strengthening downward-distorted signaling while signaling weakens the CSR effect. These insights contribute valuable guidance for green manufacturers in CSR decision-making, which functions as a component of green signaling and facilitates transitioning to dual-channel sustainable supply chains.
Förderung
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
Zitieren
APA
Hu, Y., Du, X., & Chen, L. (2024). Manufacturer Encroachment on a Sustainable Supply Chain under Asymmetric Green Information. Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research, 19(3), 2114-2138. https://doi.org/10.3390/jtaer19030103
Vancouver
Hu Y, Du X, Chen L. Manufacturer Encroachment on a Sustainable Supply Chain under Asymmetric Green Information. Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research. 2024;19(3):2114-2138. doi:10.3390/jtaer19030103
BibTeX
@article{Hu2024,
author = {Hu, Yufei and Du, Xiaorong and Chen, Lianghua},
title = {Manufacturer Encroachment on a Sustainable Supply Chain under Asymmetric Green Information},
journal = {Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research},
year = {2024},
volume = {19},
number = {3},
pages = {2114--2138},
doi = {10.3390/jtaer19030103}
}
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