Value of information with manufacturer encroachment
Production and Operations Management · 2023-03 · 32 (3) · 780-793
DOI: 10.1111/poms.13898 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Production and Operations Management, 2023-03. Verfasst von Huiqi Guan und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 63-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 25 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study the value of information in a supply chain where the manufacturer introduces a direct‐selling channel to encroach in the retailer's market. Based on different information structures regarding the direct‐selling cost for the manufacturer, we analyze three models: incomplete information model, asymmetric information model, and full information model. By comparing the firms' profits in these models, we derive the value of the manufacturer's information acquisition and the value of sharing that information with the retailer. We find that the manufacturer's information acquisition may hurt the manufacturer but benefit the retailer simultaneously. However, we also find a win–win outcome for the manufacturer and the retailer due to the manufacturer's learning of its direct‐selling cost. Further, in expectation, the manufacturer always benefits from sharing its private cost information with the retailer, while the retailer does not. We also show that the direct‐selling channel is always valuable to the manufacturer, while the retailer's preference will depend on the information structure. Finally, we consider a supply competition model where the manufacturer competes with a spot supply source to sell to the retailer. In contrast to the case of no supply competition, the manufacturer sells less using direct selling. However, direct selling can become more valuable as it may contribute higher profit for the manufacturer due to the reduced wholesale price charged to the retailer. We find that supply competition can completely reverse the manufacturer's disincentive into incentive for information acquisition and facilitate information sharing with the retailer.
Förderung
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
Zitieren
APA
Guan, H., (Ben), Z. Y., & Gurnani, H. (2023). Value of information with manufacturer encroachment. Production and Operations Management, 32(3), 780-793. https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.13898
Vancouver
Guan H, (Ben) ZY, Gurnani H. Value of information with manufacturer encroachment. Production and Operations Management. 2023;32(3):780-793. doi:10.1111/poms.13898
BibTeX
@article{Guan2023,
author = {Guan, Huiqi and (Ben), Zhibin Yang and Gurnani, Haresh},
title = {Value of information with manufacturer encroachment},
journal = {Production and Operations Management},
year = {2023},
volume = {32},
number = {3},
pages = {780--793},
doi = {10.1111/poms.13898}
}
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