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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Endogenous Agreement Geometry in Nash Bargaining over a Continuum of Issues

Alessio Staffini

Games · 06.08.2026 · 17 (4) · 41

DOI: 10.3390/g17040041 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Games, online erschienen am 06.08.2026. Verfasst von Alessio Staffini. Die Arbeit nennt 14 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Many bargaining problems allocate control over heterogeneous issues rather than a single scalar surplus. This paper studies a two-player game-theoretic Nash bargaining problem over a continuum of issues with stochastic valuation fields. Taking the classical maximum Nash welfare cutoff allocation as a benchmark, we characterize the selected agreement as an endogenous excursion set of the log-relative valuation field. We then study its economic geometry: stationarity and ergodicity yield deterministic many-issue payoff limits, a finite-domain perturbation formula separates local shocks from global cutoff feedback, Kac–Rice methods describe boundary intensity, and a perimeter penalty for fragmented contracts turns the bargain into a finite perimeter variational problem. At regular boundary points, the complexity-penalized bargain satisfies a curvature-adjusted bargaining condition. The analysis connects cooperative game theory, Nash bargaining, fair division, random field geometry, and contract complexity.

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APA

Staffini, A. (2026). Endogenous Agreement Geometry in Nash Bargaining over a Continuum of Issues. Games, 17(4), 41. https://doi.org/10.3390/g17040041

Vancouver

Staffini A. Endogenous Agreement Geometry in Nash Bargaining over a Continuum of Issues. Games. 2026;17(4):41. doi:10.3390/g17040041

BibTeX
@article{Staffini2026,
  author = {Staffini, Alessio},
  title = {Endogenous Agreement Geometry in Nash Bargaining over a Continuum of Issues},
  journal = {Games},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {17},
  number = {4},
  pages = {41},
  doi = {10.3390/g17040041}
}
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