Kantian equilibria of a class of Nash bargaining games
Journal of Public Economic Theory · 2023-08 · 25 (4) · 867-891
DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12638 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2023-03. Verfasst von Atakan Dizarlar und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 7-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 51 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study Kantian equilibria of an ‐player bargaining game, which is a modified version of the well‐known divide‐the‐dollar game. We first show that the Kantian equilibrium exists under fairly minimal assumptions. Second, if the bankruptcy rule used satisfies equal treatment of equals, and is almost nowhere proportional, then only equal division can prevail in any Kantian equilibrium. On the other hand, we show that an “anything goes” type result emerges only under the proportional rule. Finally, using hybrid bankruptcy rules that we construct in a novel fashion, we can characterize the whole equilibrium set. Our results highlight the interactions between institutions (axiomatic properties of division rules) and agents' equilibrium behavior.
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APA
Dizarlar, A., & Karagözoğlu, E. (2023). Kantian equilibria of a class of Nash bargaining games. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 25(4), 867-891. https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12638
Vancouver
Dizarlar A, Karagözoğlu E. Kantian equilibria of a class of Nash bargaining games. Journal of Public Economic Theory. 2023;25(4):867-891. doi:10.1111/jpet.12638
BibTeX
@article{Dizarlar2023,
author = {Dizarlar, Atakan and Karagözoğlu, Emin},
title = {Kantian equilibria of a class of Nash bargaining games},
journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory},
year = {2023},
volume = {25},
number = {4},
pages = {867--891},
doi = {10.1111/jpet.12638}
}
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