Monopoly and Endogenous Single Highest Quality
Games · 06.04.2026 · 17 (2) · 19
DOI: 10.3390/g17020019 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Games, online erschienen am 06.04.2026. Verfasst von Amit Gayer. Die Arbeit nennt 27 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper analyzes a monopolistic market with a continuum of consumers in the linear case. Consumers are vertically differentiated by a one-dimensional preference for quality, and the monopolist is allowed to offer a menu of quality-price pairs. The analysis shows that, in the linear case, the monopolist’s optimal offer endogenously collapses to a single quality-price pair, where the quality equals the highest feasible level. In addition, welfare maximization is achieved if and only if the market is fully served in equilibrium.
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APA
Gayer, A. (2026). Monopoly and Endogenous Single Highest Quality. Games, 17(2), 19. https://doi.org/10.3390/g17020019
Vancouver
Gayer A. Monopoly and Endogenous Single Highest Quality. Games. 2026;17(2):19. doi:10.3390/g17020019
BibTeX
@article{Gayer2026,
author = {Gayer, Amit},
title = {Monopoly and Endogenous Single Highest Quality},
journal = {Games},
year = {2026},
volume = {17},
number = {2},
pages = {19},
doi = {10.3390/g17020019}
}
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