Robust Monopoly Regulation
American Economic Review · 01.02.2025 · 115 (2) · 599-634
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20191950 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Review, erschienen am 01.02.2025. Verfasst von Yingni Guo und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 11-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 55 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study how to regulate a monopolistic firm using a robust-design, non-Bayesian approach. We derive a policy that minimizes the regulator’s worst-case regret, where regret is the difference between the regulator’s complete-information payoff and his realized payoff. When the regulator’s payoff is consumers’ surplus, he caps the firm’s average revenue. When his payoff is the total surplus of both consumers and the firm, he offers a piece rate subsidy to the firm while capping the total subsidy. For intermediate cases, the regulator combines these three policy instruments to balance three goals: protecting consumers’ surplus, mitigating underproduction, and limiting potential overproduction. (JEL D21, D42, D83, H25, L51)
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APA
Guo, Y., & Shmaya, E. (2025). Robust Monopoly Regulation. American Economic Review, 115(2), 599-634. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20191950
Vancouver
Guo Y, Shmaya E. Robust Monopoly Regulation. American Economic Review. 2025;115(2):599-634. doi:10.1257/aer.20191950
BibTeX
@article{Guo2025,
author = {Guo, Yingni and Shmaya, Eran},
title = {Robust Monopoly Regulation},
journal = {American Economic Review},
year = {2025},
volume = {115},
number = {2},
pages = {599--634},
doi = {10.1257/aer.20191950}
}
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