EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Crossref

Robust Monopoly Regulation

Yingni Guo, Eran Shmaya

American Economic Review · 01.02.2025 · 115 (2) · 599-634

DOI: 10.1257/aer.20191950 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Review, erschienen am 01.02.2025. Verfasst von Yingni Guo und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 11-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 55 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We study how to regulate a monopolistic firm using a robust-design, non-Bayesian approach. We derive a policy that minimizes the regulator’s worst-case regret, where regret is the difference between the regulator’s complete-information payoff and his realized payoff. When the regulator’s payoff is consumers’ surplus, he caps the firm’s average revenue. When his payoff is the total surplus of both consumers and the firm, he offers a piece rate subsidy to the firm while capping the total subsidy. For intermediate cases, the regulator combines these three policy instruments to balance three goals: protecting consumers’ surplus, mitigating underproduction, and limiting potential overproduction. (JEL D21, D42, D83, H25, L51)

Zitieren

APA

Guo, Y., & Shmaya, E. (2025). Robust Monopoly Regulation. American Economic Review, 115(2), 599-634. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20191950

Vancouver

Guo Y, Shmaya E. Robust Monopoly Regulation. American Economic Review. 2025;115(2):599-634. doi:10.1257/aer.20191950

BibTeX
@article{Guo2025,
  author = {Guo, Yingni and Shmaya, Eran},
  title = {Robust Monopoly Regulation},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {115},
  number = {2},
  pages = {599--634},
  doi = {10.1257/aer.20191950}
}
Kostenlos starten →