Bounded Encrypted Corroboration for Decentralized Collaborative Cyber Threat Detection
Electronics · 19.11.2026 · 15 (22) · 5396
DOI: 10.3390/electronics15225396 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Electronics, online erschienen am 19.11.2026. Verfasst von Huda Ali Alatawi. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Organizations rarely corroborate one another’s intrusion detections because doing so discloses evidence. Proof-of-Detection is a consensus mechanism that lets them corroborate without disclosing raw evidence. Validators at peer organizations score a detected event against their own flagged detections, cap the score at the threshold divided by the quorum k and submit it encrypted. Key holders decrypt one sum per event and only over the report set fixed by a signed record. If enclave attestation and threshold decryption behave as specified, raw telemetry stays at its site and no individual score is decrypted alone, although the opened sum can constrain individual scores. The prototype emulates both layers. Fewer than k dishonest validator slots cannot cause acceptance on their own, but they can tip an event that honest validators partly corroborate. One compromised organization reaches the quorum alone with three slots per organization but not with one. On a 1,000,256-flow sample of NF-UQ-NIDS-v2 from four organizations, consensus rejected 1497 of 1499 false positives of sensitive local detectors, including 1490 of them from one weak detector. Weighted precision rose from 0.92 to 0.9999, and weighted end-to-end recall was 0.82 against 0.96 for local detection alone. Three of the five shared attack families were confirmed almost completely, and organization-specific ones were mostly not, so consensus suits ranking alerts. Members sharing one network removed almost no false positives, so the benefit depends on diversity among members. An encrypted round took 66 ms on one core.
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APA
Alatawi, H. A. (2026). Bounded Encrypted Corroboration for Decentralized Collaborative Cyber Threat Detection. Electronics, 15(22), 5396. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics15225396
Vancouver
Alatawi HA. Bounded Encrypted Corroboration for Decentralized Collaborative Cyber Threat Detection. Electronics. 2026;15(22):5396. doi:10.3390/electronics15225396
BibTeX
@article{Alatawi2026,
author = {Alatawi, Huda Ali},
title = {Bounded Encrypted Corroboration for Decentralized Collaborative Cyber Threat Detection},
journal = {Electronics},
year = {2026},
volume = {15},
number = {22},
pages = {5396},
doi = {10.3390/electronics15225396}
}
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