EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Internal Controls and Corporate Strategy Choices: A Micro-Level Explanation of the Government Subsidies “Support for the Weak” Phenomenon

Chao Ge, Mengyuan Li, Yangyang Wang, Wunhong Su

Journal of East European Management Studies · 29.06.2026 · 31 (3)

DOI: 10.31083/jeems40738 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of East European Management Studies, online erschienen am 29.06.2026. Verfasst von Chao Ge und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 43 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

The effective utilization of Government Subsidies funds has long been a focal concern for both scholars and policymakers, while elucidating the underlying mechanisms behind the government’s preferential support for vulnerable groups serves as a crucial foundation for mitigating and managing associated risks. Using a sample of A-share listed firms in China from 2009 to 2023, this study examines the relationship between firms’ Internal Controls quality and the government subsidies they receive. The results indicate that higher Internal Controls quality is associated with lower levels of government subsidies. Mechanism test results suggest that this negative correlation primarily stems from the fact that Internal Controls can mitigate a firm’s inclination to assume political obligations in exchange for government subsidies while simultaneously enhancing competitiveness and thereby reducing excessive dependence on governmental support. Further research results indicate that when firms belong to the new energy industry or receive innovation-related subsidies, the inhibitory effect of Internal Controls on government subsidies is weakened. This study elucidates the formation mechanism underlying the “support for the weak” phenomenon in Government Subsidies allocation. By integrating firm-level agency behavior and strategic choice, this study supplements the extant literature with a micro-level explanation, revealing that subsidy distribution is a bilateral matching process between the government and firms. These findings offer valuable insights into the interplay between firms and government subsidies, informing more rational policymaking and implementation.

Zitieren

APA

Ge, C., Li, M., Wang, Y., & Su, W. (2026). Internal Controls and Corporate Strategy Choices: A Micro-Level Explanation of the Government Subsidies “Support for the Weak” Phenomenon. Journal of East European Management Studies, 31(3). https://doi.org/10.31083/jeems40738

Vancouver

Ge C, Li M, Wang Y, Su W. Internal Controls and Corporate Strategy Choices: A Micro-Level Explanation of the Government Subsidies “Support for the Weak” Phenomenon. Journal of East European Management Studies. 2026;31(3). doi:10.31083/jeems40738

BibTeX
@article{Ge2026,
  author = {Ge, Chao and Li, Mengyuan and Wang, Yangyang and Su, Wunhong},
  title = {Internal Controls and Corporate Strategy Choices: A Micro-Level Explanation of the Government Subsidies “Support for the Weak” Phenomenon},
  journal = {Journal of East European Management Studies},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {31},
  number = {3},
  doi = {10.31083/jeems40738}
}
Kostenlos starten →