Government Subsidies and Corporate Misconduct
Journal of Accounting Research · 2024-09 · 62 (4) · 1449-1496
DOI: 10.1111/1475-679x.12553 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Accounting Research, online erschienen am 18.05.2024. Verfasst von ANEESH RAGHUNANDAN. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 50-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 45 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
I study whether firms that receive targeted U.S. state‐level subsidies are more likely to subsequently engage in corporate misconduct. I find that firms are more likely to engage in misconduct in subsidizing states, but not in other states that they operate in, after receiving state subsidies. Using data on both federal and state enforcement actions, and exploiting the legal principle of dual sovereignty for identification, I show that this finding reflects an increase in the underlying rate of misconduct and that this increase is attributable to lenient state‐level misconduct enforcement. Collectively, my findings present evidence of an important consequence of targeted firm‐specific subsidies: nonfinancial misconduct that potentially could impact the very stakeholders subsidies are ostensibly intended to benefit.
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APA
RAGHUNANDAN, A. (2024). Government Subsidies and Corporate Misconduct. Journal of Accounting Research, 62(4), 1449-1496. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12553
Vancouver
RAGHUNANDAN A. Government Subsidies and Corporate Misconduct. Journal of Accounting Research. 2024;62(4):1449-1496. doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12553
BibTeX
@article{RAGHUNANDAN2024,
author = {RAGHUNANDAN, ANEESH},
title = {Government Subsidies and Corporate Misconduct},
journal = {Journal of Accounting Research},
year = {2024},
volume = {62},
number = {4},
pages = {1449--1496},
doi = {10.1111/1475-679x.12553}
}
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