Sufficient Autonomy and Satiable Reasons
Law, Ethics and Philosophy · 2018
DOI: 10.31009/leap.2017.v5.13 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Law, Ethics and Philosophy, 2018. Verfasst von ROBERT HUSEBY.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In this paper, I examine Liam Shields' principle of sufficient autonomy. This principle is in many ways interesting and plausible, but it is also in some important respects inadequately specified. In particular, I argue that a) the role of satiable reasons should be clarified, b) the relation to the conditions of freedom should be made more explicit, and c) the threshold for sufficient autonomy should be specified.
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APA
HUSEBY, R. (2018). Sufficient Autonomy and Satiable Reasons. Law, Ethics and Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.31009/leap.2017.v5.13
Vancouver
HUSEBY R. Sufficient Autonomy and Satiable Reasons. Law, Ethics and Philosophy. 2018. doi:10.31009/leap.2017.v5.13
BibTeX
@article{HUSEBY2018,
author = {HUSEBY, ROBERT},
title = {Sufficient Autonomy and Satiable Reasons},
journal = {Law, Ethics and Philosophy},
year = {2018},
doi = {10.31009/leap.2017.v5.13}
}
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