Laws and Reasons Why
Analytic Philosophy · 2026-12 · 67 (4) · 354-365
DOI: 10.1111/phib.12391 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Analytic Philosophy, online erschienen am 15.09.2025. Verfasst von Julio De Rizzo. Die Arbeit nennt 43 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Austrian Science Fund.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Laws play some role in explanations: at the very least, they somehow connect what is explained, or the explanandum , to what explains, or the explanans . Thus, thermodynamical laws connect the match's being struck and its lightning, so that the former causes the latter; and laws about set formation connect Socrates' existence with {Socrates}'s existence, so that the former grounds the latter. But is there more to the explanatory role of laws? A natural proposal, which finds considerable support in the literature, is that laws simply are reasons why. That is, besides connecting the explanandum with a suitable ground or cause, they take part, together with these, in explaining why the explanandum obtains. In this paper, I present two arguments that show that this proposal cannot hold in general. They each point to one unacceptable consequence: a suspicious infinite extendibility of explanantia; and a failure of the irreflexivity of “because.”
Förderung
- Austrian Science Fund
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APA
Rizzo, J. D. (2026). Laws and Reasons Why. Analytic Philosophy, 67(4), 354-365. https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12391
Vancouver
Rizzo JD. Laws and Reasons Why. Analytic Philosophy. 2026;67(4):354-365. doi:10.1111/phib.12391
BibTeX
@article{Rizzo2026,
author = {Rizzo, Julio De},
title = {Laws and Reasons Why},
journal = {Analytic Philosophy},
year = {2026},
volume = {67},
number = {4},
pages = {354--365},
doi = {10.1111/phib.12391}
}
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