The Case for Stance-Dependent Reasons
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy · 01.06.2019 · 15 (2) · 146-174
DOI: 10.26556/jesp.v15i2.517 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, online erschienen am 01.06.2019. Verfasst von David Sobel. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 11-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 53 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Many philosophers maintain that neither one’s reasons for action nor one’s well-being are ever grounded in facts about what we desire or favor. Yet our reason to eat a flavor of ice cream we like rather than one we do not seems an obvious counterexample. I argue that there is no getting around such examples and that therefore a fully stance-independent account of the grounding of our reasons is implausible. At least in matters of mere taste, our “stance” plays a normative role in grounding reasons.
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APA
Sobel, D. (2019). The Case for Stance-Dependent Reasons. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 15(2), 146-174. https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v15i2.517
Vancouver
Sobel D. The Case for Stance-Dependent Reasons. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy. 2019;15(2):146-174. doi:10.26556/jesp.v15i2.517
BibTeX
@article{Sobel2019,
author = {Sobel, David},
title = {The Case for Stance-Dependent Reasons},
journal = {Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy},
year = {2019},
volume = {15},
number = {2},
pages = {146--174},
doi = {10.26556/jesp.v15i2.517}
}
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