Reasons for Belief in Context
Episteme · 2024-12 · 21 (4) · 1308-1323
DOI: 10.1017/epi.2023.30 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Episteme, online erschienen am 05.07.2023. Verfasst von Darren Bradley. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 77 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: John Templeton Foundation.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
There is currently a lively debate about whether there are practical reasons for belief, epistemic reasons for belief, or both. I will argue that the intuitions on all sides can be fully accounted for by applying an independently motivated contextualist semantics for normative terms. Specifically, normative terms must be relativized to a goal. One possible goal is epistemic, such as believing truly and not believing falsely, while another possible goal is practical, such as satisfying desires, or maximizing value. I will argue that we have practical reasons given the practical goal and epistemic reasons given the epistemic goal. Disagreement disappears when we make the context explicit. The result is an independently motivated version of pluralism .
Förderung
- John Templeton Foundation
Zitieren
APA
Bradley, D. (2024). Reasons for Belief in Context. Episteme, 21(4), 1308-1323. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2023.30
Vancouver
Bradley D. Reasons for Belief in Context. Episteme. 2024;21(4):1308-1323. doi:10.1017/epi.2023.30
BibTeX
@article{Bradley2024,
author = {Bradley, Darren},
title = {Reasons for Belief in Context},
journal = {Episteme},
year = {2024},
volume = {21},
number = {4},
pages = {1308--1323},
doi = {10.1017/epi.2023.30}
}
EUVIMED