Tax-Induced Shifts in Risk-Taking Incentives and Executive Compensation Design
The Accounting Review · 01.11.2026 · 101 (6) · 145-173
DOI: 10.2308/tar-2023-0226 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Accounting Review, online erschienen am 09.10.2026. Verfasst von Jennifer L. Blouin und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 73 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Theory suggests that changes in corporate tax rates can alter the dispersion of after-tax project payoffs, thereby altering the exposure of firm-level risk transmitted to executives through compensation. Using state tax changes, we observe firms shifting away from option-based compensation following state corporate tax rate increases. This result is concentrated in compensation contracts that lack relative performance evaluation (RPE) features, which filter common shocks to performance and influence the type of risk executives are incentivized to take. We also find that firms are more likely to initiate RPE shortly after a state tax rate increase and that firms that adjusted compensation through reductions in equity risk incentives or used RPE were less likely to experience a subsequent increase in systematic risk following a state tax rate increase. Overall, our findings provide novel insight into how taxes can influence CEO compensation design and the transmission of firm-level risk to executives. Data Availability: Data are obtained from public sources identified in the paper. JEL Classifications: G32; H32; J33; J41; L25.
Zitieren
APA
Blouin, J. L., Kubick, T. R., & Robinson, J. R. (2026). Tax-Induced Shifts in Risk-Taking Incentives and Executive Compensation Design. The Accounting Review, 101(6), 145-173. https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2023-0226
Vancouver
Blouin JL, Kubick TR, Robinson JR. Tax-Induced Shifts in Risk-Taking Incentives and Executive Compensation Design. The Accounting Review. 2026;101(6):145-173. doi:10.2308/tar-2023-0226
BibTeX
@article{Blouin2026,
author = {Blouin, Jennifer L. and Kubick, Thomas R. and Robinson, John R.},
title = {Tax-Induced Shifts in Risk-Taking Incentives and Executive Compensation Design},
journal = {The Accounting Review},
year = {2026},
volume = {101},
number = {6},
pages = {145--173},
doi = {10.2308/tar-2023-0226}
}
EUVIMED