Corporate Tax Breaks and Executive Compensation
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 01.08.2023 · 15 (3) · 215-255
DOI: 10.1257/pol.20210155 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, erschienen am 01.08.2023. Verfasst von Eric Ohrn. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 10-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 91 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
I analyze the effect of two corporate tax breaks, bonus depreciation and the Domestic Production Activities Deduction (DPAD), on executive compensation in publicly traded US firms. I find both tax breaks significantly increase executive compensation. For every dollar a firm benefits from the tax breaks, compensation of the firm’s top five highest-paid executives increases by $0.17 to $0.25. The tax breaks increase compensation primarily in firms with weaker governance structures, suggesting the compensation response is driven by executive rent extraction. (JEL D22, G34, H25, M12, M52)
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APA
Ohrn, E. (2023). Corporate Tax Breaks and Executive Compensation. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 15(3), 215-255. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20210155
Vancouver
Ohrn E. Corporate Tax Breaks and Executive Compensation. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy. 2023;15(3):215-255. doi:10.1257/pol.20210155
BibTeX
@article{Ohrn2023,
author = {Ohrn, Eric},
title = {Corporate Tax Breaks and Executive Compensation},
journal = {American Economic Journal: Economic Policy},
year = {2023},
volume = {15},
number = {3},
pages = {215--255},
doi = {10.1257/pol.20210155}
}
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