IS EPISTEMIC PERMISSIVISM INTUITIVE?
American Philosophical Quarterly · 01.10.2018 · 55 (4) · 365-378
DOI: 10.2307/45128631 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Philosophical Quarterly, erschienen am 01.10.2018. Verfasst von Nathan Ballantyne. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 5-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 46 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In recent debates over permissivism and uniqueness—two theses concerning the relationship between evidence and epistemic rationality—some philosophers have claimed that permissivism has an intuitive advantage over uniqueness. I examine the cases alleged to intuitively motivate permissivism and suggest they do not provide prima facie support for permissivism. I conclude by explaining how my discussion bears on whether permissivism can defeat skeptical arguments based on recognized peer disagreement and the historical contingency of our beliefs.
Zitieren
APA
Ballantyne, N. (2018). IS EPISTEMIC PERMISSIVISM INTUITIVE?. American Philosophical Quarterly, 55(4), 365-378. https://doi.org/10.2307/45128631
Vancouver
Ballantyne N. IS EPISTEMIC PERMISSIVISM INTUITIVE?. American Philosophical Quarterly. 2018;55(4):365-378. doi:10.2307/45128631
BibTeX
@article{Ballantyne2018,
author = {Ballantyne, Nathan},
title = {IS EPISTEMIC PERMISSIVISM INTUITIVE?},
journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly},
year = {2018},
volume = {55},
number = {4},
pages = {365--378},
doi = {10.2307/45128631}
}
EUVIMED