Decomposing Moral Hazard in Prevented Planting
AgEcon Search (University of Minnesota, USA) · 01.01.2025
DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.361185 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift AgEcon Search (University of Minnesota, USA), erschienen am 01.01.2025. Verfasst von Lee und 4 weiteren Autor:innen.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Prevented planting (PP) provision of the US Federal Crop Insurance Program (FCIP) indemnifies when the adverse weather or field condition prevents the insured from planting. We explore empirical relationships between weather and PP using two different datasets, observational and experimental, to assess whether moral hazard behavior exists in PP provision in the US FCIP. Overall, we find that observed PP is more sensitive to weather than PP occurrence in experimental data. Our finding implies that producers with crop insurance and PP provision tend to react more responsively to adverse weather than they would otherwise, indicating a form of moral hazard behavior.
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APA
Lee, Seungki, Won, S., Yu, & Jisang (2025). Decomposing Moral Hazard in Prevented Planting. AgEcon Search (University of Minnesota, USA). https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.361185
Vancouver
Lee, Seungki, Won S, Yu, Jisang. Decomposing Moral Hazard in Prevented Planting. AgEcon Search (University of Minnesota, USA). 2025. doi:10.22004/ag.econ.361185
BibTeX
@article{Lee2025,
author = {Lee and Seungki and Won, Sunjae and Yu and Jisang},
title = {Decomposing Moral Hazard in Prevented Planting},
journal = {AgEcon Search (University of Minnesota, USA)},
year = {2025},
doi = {10.22004/ag.econ.361185}
}
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