Moral Hazard versus Liquidity in Household Bankruptcy
The Journal of Finance · 2023-10 · 78 (5) · 2421-2464
DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13263 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Finance, online erschienen am 28.07.2023. Verfasst von SASHA INDARTE. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 48-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 89 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper studies the role of moral hazard and liquidity in driving household bankruptcy. First, I estimate that increases in potential debt forgiveness have a positive, but small, effect on filing using a regression kink design. Second, exploiting quasi‐experimental variation in mortgage payment reductions, I estimate that filing is five times more responsive to cash‐on‐hand than relief generosity. Using a sufficient statistic, I show the estimates imply large consumption‐smoothing benefits of bankruptcy for the marginal filer. Finally, I conclude that 83% of the filing response to dischargeable debt comes from liquidity effects rather than a moral hazard response to financial incentives.
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APA
INDARTE, S. (2023). Moral Hazard versus Liquidity in Household Bankruptcy. The Journal of Finance, 78(5), 2421-2464. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13263
Vancouver
INDARTE S. Moral Hazard versus Liquidity in Household Bankruptcy. The Journal of Finance. 2023;78(5):2421-2464. doi:10.1111/jofi.13263
BibTeX
@article{INDARTE2023,
author = {INDARTE, SASHA},
title = {Moral Hazard versus Liquidity in Household Bankruptcy},
journal = {The Journal of Finance},
year = {2023},
volume = {78},
number = {5},
pages = {2421--2464},
doi = {10.1111/jofi.13263}
}
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