What explains variation in state compliance with the Laws of Armed Conflict under conditions of low reciprocity?
SSRN Electronic Journal · 2026
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.6546018 ↗At a glance
Journal article in SSRN Electronic Journal, 2026. Written by Aaryan Srivastava. 21 references.
Abstract (original language)
This paper explains variation in compliance with the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) under asymmetric conditions where reciprocity is weak or absent. Using the 1991 Gulf War, the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War, and the Russo-Ukrainian War as comparative cases, it argues that international reputation acts as a substitute compliance mechanism when material reciprocity fails. The analysis finds that actors dependent on external legitimacy, diplomatic backing, or military assistance maintain greater restraint toward civilians, while actors insulated from audience costs are more likely to use LOAC violations instrumentally for tactical advantage. The paper also identifies a boundary condition: reputational incentives can weaken when perceived security costs of restraint exceed expected political penalties.
Cite
APA
Srivastava, A. (2026). What explains variation in state compliance with the Laws of Armed Conflict under conditions of low reciprocity?. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6546018
Vancouver
Srivastava A. What explains variation in state compliance with the Laws of Armed Conflict under conditions of low reciprocity?. SSRN Electronic Journal. 2026. doi:10.2139/ssrn.6546018
BibTeX
@article{Srivastava2026,
author = {Srivastava, Aaryan},
title = {What explains variation in state compliance with the Laws of Armed Conflict under conditions of low reciprocity?},
journal = {SSRN Electronic Journal},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.2139/ssrn.6546018}
}
EUVIMED