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WHEN FISCAL EFFICIENCY MEETS DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: NEGOTIATING THE POLITICIAN'S DILEMMA IN LOCAL BUDGETING

Andry Muliadi, Ariana Yunus, Andi Ali Armunanto, Muhammad Ilham Dhani Asriawan

Veredas do Direito · 29.07.2026 · 23 (12) · e237578

DOI: 10.18623/rvd.v23.7578 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Veredas do Direito, online erschienen am 29.07.2026. Verfasst von Andry Muliadi und 3 weiteren Autor:innen.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This study examines the dynamics of budget politics in the implementation of Presidential Instruction No. 1 of 2025 on budget efficiency in Pinrang Regency, Indonesia. While fiscal efficiency policies are formally designed to strengthen macroeconomic stability and promote budget discipline, their implementation within decentralized governance structures generates complex political consequences at the local level. Using a qualitative case study approach, this research analyzes how members of the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) navigate the structural tension between compliance with national fiscal directives and responsiveness to constituency demands. Drawing on in-depth interviews with legislative, executive, party, and societal actors, as well as analysis of the 2025 Regional Budget (APBD) documents, the findings reveal that fiscal efficiency reshapes—rather than reduces—the political character of budgeting. The narrowing of fiscal space intensifies negotiation, incremental bargaining, and strategic compromise between the legislature and the executive. Technocratic rationality, electoral incentives, and distributive claims interact within a constrained fiscal corridor, producing a negotiated equilibrium rather than purely technocratic outcomes. The study confirms the relevance of Irene S. Rubin’s politics of budgeting framework and Barbara Geddes’ politician’s dilemma in explaining local budget dynamics under national efficiency mandates. Ultimately, the case of Pinrang demonstrates that fiscal austerity functions as a mechanism of political restructuring, transforming the modalities of representation, patronage, and institutional bargaining within decentralized systems.

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APA

Muliadi, A., Yunus, A., Armunanto, A. A., & Asriawan, M. I. D. (2026). WHEN FISCAL EFFICIENCY MEETS DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: NEGOTIATING THE POLITICIAN'S DILEMMA IN LOCAL BUDGETING. Veredas do Direito, 23(12), e237578. https://doi.org/10.18623/rvd.v23.7578

Vancouver

Muliadi A, Yunus A, Armunanto AA, Asriawan MID. WHEN FISCAL EFFICIENCY MEETS DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: NEGOTIATING THE POLITICIAN'S DILEMMA IN LOCAL BUDGETING. Veredas do Direito. 2026;23(12):e237578. doi:10.18623/rvd.v23.7578

BibTeX
@article{Muliadi2026,
  author = {Muliadi, Andry and Yunus, Ariana and Armunanto, Andi Ali and Asriawan, Muhammad Ilham Dhani},
  title = {WHEN FISCAL EFFICIENCY MEETS DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: NEGOTIATING THE POLITICIAN'S DILEMMA IN LOCAL BUDGETING},
  journal = {Veredas do Direito},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {23},
  number = {12},
  pages = {e237578},
  doi = {10.18623/rvd.v23.7578}
}
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