Discrete regimes of information reception in non-antagonistic repeated game
Mathematical Game Theory and Applications · 2020
DOI: 10.17076/mgta_2020_1_8 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Mathematical Game Theory and Applications, 2020. Verfasst von Елена Захаровна Мохонько und 1 weiteren Autor:innen.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The gain functions depend on the choices of players and time. The set of choices of the second player is changed in time according to one of some variants. The true variant is ascertained during the game. The current information about the set of choices and about partner's choices is received as sample data. An optimal discrete procedure of obtaining information is found that allows preserving the equilibrium.
Zitieren
APA
Мохонько, Е. З., & Mokhonko, E. (2020). Discrete regimes of information reception in non-antagonistic repeated game. Mathematical Game Theory and Applications. https://doi.org/10.17076/mgta_2020_1_8
Vancouver
Мохонько ЕЗ, Mokhonko E. Discrete regimes of information reception in non-antagonistic repeated game. Mathematical Game Theory and Applications. 2020. doi:10.17076/mgta_2020_1_8
BibTeX
@article{2020,
author = {Мохонько, Елена Захаровна and Mokhonko, Elena},
title = {Discrete regimes of information reception in non-antagonistic repeated game},
journal = {Mathematical Game Theory and Applications},
year = {2020},
doi = {10.17076/mgta_2020_1_8}
}
EUVIMED