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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Adaptive dynamics of memory-one strategies in the repeated donation game

Philip LaPorte iD, Christian Hilbe iD, Martin A Nowak

PLOS Computational Biology · 29.06.2023 · 19 (6) · e1010987

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010987 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift PLOS Computational Biology, online erschienen am 29.06.2023. Verfasst von Philip LaPorte und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Department of Mathematics, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California, United States of America. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 12-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 57 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: HORIZON EUROPE European Research Council.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Human interactions can take the form of social dilemmas: collectively, people fare best if all cooperate but each individual is tempted to free ride. Social dilemmas can be resolved when individuals interact repeatedly. Repetition allows them to adopt reciprocal strategies which incentivize cooperation. The most basic model for direct reciprocity is the repeated donation game, a variant of the prisoner’s dilemma. Two players interact over many rounds; in each round they decide whether to cooperate or to defect. Strategies take into account the history of the play. Memory-one strategies depend only on the previous round. Even though they are among the most elementary strategies of direct reciprocity, their evolutionary dynamics has been difficult to study analytically. As a result, much previous work has relied on simulations. Here, we derive and analyze their adaptive dynamics. We show that the four-dimensional space of memory-one strategies has an invariant three-dimensional subspace, generated by the memory-one counting strategies. Counting strategies record how many players cooperated in the previous round, without considering who cooperated. We give a partial characterization of adaptive dynamics for memory-one strategies and a full characterization for memory-one counting strategies.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

Cooperative BehaviorBiological EvolutionHumansGame Theory

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • Department of Mathematics, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California, United States of America.
  • Max Planck Research Group 'Dynamics of Social Behavior', Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön, Germany.
  • Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachussetts, United States of America.
  • Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachussetts, United States of America.

ORCID-Profile: Philip LaPorte, Christian Hilbe

Förderung

  • HORIZON EUROPE European Research Council

Zitieren

APA

LaPorte, P., Hilbe, C., & Nowak, M. A. (2023). Adaptive dynamics of memory-one strategies in the repeated donation game. PLOS Computational Biology, 19(6), e1010987. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010987

Vancouver

LaPorte P, Hilbe C, Nowak MA. Adaptive dynamics of memory-one strategies in the repeated donation game. PLOS Computational Biology. 2023;19(6):e1010987. doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010987

BibTeX
@article{LaPorte2023,
  author = {LaPorte, Philip and Hilbe, Christian and Nowak, Martin A},
  title = {Adaptive dynamics of memory-one strategies in the repeated donation game},
  journal = {PLOS Computational Biology},
  year = {2023},
  volume = {19},
  number = {6},
  pages = {e1010987},
  doi = {10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010987}
}
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