Adaptive dynamics of memory-one strategies in the repeated donation game
PLOS Computational Biology · 29.06.2023 · 19 (6) · e1010987
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010987 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift PLOS Computational Biology, online erschienen am 29.06.2023. Verfasst von Philip LaPorte und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Department of Mathematics, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California, United States of America. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 12-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 57 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: HORIZON EUROPE European Research Council.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Human interactions can take the form of social dilemmas: collectively, people fare best if all cooperate but each individual is tempted to free ride. Social dilemmas can be resolved when individuals interact repeatedly. Repetition allows them to adopt reciprocal strategies which incentivize cooperation. The most basic model for direct reciprocity is the repeated donation game, a variant of the prisoner’s dilemma. Two players interact over many rounds; in each round they decide whether to cooperate or to defect. Strategies take into account the history of the play. Memory-one strategies depend only on the previous round. Even though they are among the most elementary strategies of direct reciprocity, their evolutionary dynamics has been difficult to study analytically. As a result, much previous work has relied on simulations. Here, we derive and analyze their adaptive dynamics. We show that the four-dimensional space of memory-one strategies has an invariant three-dimensional subspace, generated by the memory-one counting strategies. Counting strategies record how many players cooperated in the previous round, without considering who cooperated. We give a partial characterization of adaptive dynamics for memory-one strategies and a full characterization for memory-one counting strategies.
Schlagwörter
MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)
Autor:innen und Institutionen
- Department of Mathematics, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California, United States of America.
- Max Planck Research Group 'Dynamics of Social Behavior', Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön, Germany.
- Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachussetts, United States of America.
- Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachussetts, United States of America.
ORCID-Profile: Philip LaPorte, Christian Hilbe
Förderung
- HORIZON EUROPE European Research Council
Zitieren
APA
LaPorte, P., Hilbe, C., & Nowak, M. A. (2023). Adaptive dynamics of memory-one strategies in the repeated donation game. PLOS Computational Biology, 19(6), e1010987. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010987
Vancouver
LaPorte P, Hilbe C, Nowak MA. Adaptive dynamics of memory-one strategies in the repeated donation game. PLOS Computational Biology. 2023;19(6):e1010987. doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010987
BibTeX
@article{LaPorte2023,
author = {LaPorte, Philip and Hilbe, Christian and Nowak, Martin A},
title = {Adaptive dynamics of memory-one strategies in the repeated donation game},
journal = {PLOS Computational Biology},
year = {2023},
volume = {19},
number = {6},
pages = {e1010987},
doi = {10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010987}
}
EUVIMED