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The Fragility of Perfectly Safe Digital Money

Elizabeth C. Klee, Arazi Lubis, Chase Ross, Sharon Y. Ross, Alexandros Vardoulakis

Finance and Economics Discussion Series · 2026-06 · (2026-037) · 1-1

DOI: 10.17016/feds.2026.037 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Finance and Economics Discussion Series, 2026-06. Verfasst von Elizabeth C. Klee und 4 weiteren Autor:innen.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Digital money differs from previous forms of money in an important way: it unbundles trust. Instead of relying on a trustworthy institution to settle payments, it relies on decentralized verification, whose cost is priced separately through congestion-sensitive gas fees. This arrangement creates a novel fragility from the interaction of two opposing forces: network externalities, which make digital money more valuable as adoption rises, and congestion fees, which make it more costly to use. We show that these forces generate strategic complementarities in redemption decisions and can create runs even when digital money is backed by perfectly safe reserves.

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APA

Klee, E. C., Lubis, A., Ross, C., Ross, S. Y., & Vardoulakis, A. (2026). The Fragility of Perfectly Safe Digital Money. Finance and Economics Discussion Series, 1-1. https://doi.org/10.17016/feds.2026.037

Vancouver

Klee EC, Lubis A, Ross C, Ross SY, Vardoulakis A. The Fragility of Perfectly Safe Digital Money. Finance and Economics Discussion Series. 2026:1-1. doi:10.17016/feds.2026.037

BibTeX
@article{Klee2026,
  author = {Klee, Elizabeth C. and Lubis, Arazi and Ross, Chase and Ross, Sharon Y. and Vardoulakis, Alexandros},
  title = {The Fragility of Perfectly Safe Digital Money},
  journal = {Finance and Economics Discussion Series},
  year = {2026},
  number = {2026-037},
  pages = {1--1},
  doi = {10.17016/feds.2026.037}
}
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