Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Review of Finance, online erschienen am 10.10.2026. Verfasst von Jon Frost und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 53 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: European Research Council.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study competition between two payment instruments: bank deposits and digital platform tokens. Using a Hotelling model that integrates the theory of two-sided markets and payment economics, we assess how this competition is affected by a public payment infrastructure that makes private payment instruments interoperable. We show that interoperability, whether implemented as a fast payment system or a central bank digital currency, may eliminate payment access exclusion and increase trade volumes and social welfare, but at the cost of some disintermediation. When new payment service providers (PSPs) enter and compete for consumers, they soften competition for merchants: incumbent intermediaries then charge merchants higher fees and earn higher profits. This contrasts with the entry of PSPs on the merchant side, which instead disciplines incumbent fees.
Förderung
- European Research Council
Zitieren
APA
Frost, J., Rochet, J., Shin, H. S., & Verdier, M. (2026). Competing digital money. Review of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfag046
Vancouver
Frost J, Rochet J, Shin HS, Verdier M. Competing digital money. Review of Finance. 2026. doi:10.1093/rof/rfag046
BibTeX
@article{Frost2026,
author = {Frost, Jon and Rochet, Jean-Charles and Shin, Hyun Song and Verdier, Marianne},
title = {Competing digital money},
journal = {Review of Finance},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1093/rof/rfag046}
}
EUVIMED