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Modeling and Verifying Security Protocols with the Applied Pi Calculus and ProVerif

Bruno Blanchet

Foundations and Trends® in Privacy and Security · 2016-10-31 · 1 (1-2) · 1-135

DOI: 10.1561/3300000004 ↗

At a glance

Journal article in Foundations and Trends® in Privacy and Security, published online on 2016-10-31. Written by Bruno Blanchet. Cited 269 times so far (Crossref); 152 references.

AbstractBibliografiske oplysningerCiteRelated studies

Abstract (original language)

ProVerif is an automatic symbolic protocol verifier. It supports a wide range of cryptographic primitives, defined by rewrite rules or by equations. It can prove various security properties: secrecy, authentication, and process equivalences, for an unbounded message space and an unbounded number of sessions. It takes as input a description of the protocol to verify in a dialect of the applied pi calculus, an extension of the pi calculus with cryptography. It automatically translates this protocol description into Horn clauses and determines whether the desired security properties hold by resolution on these clauses. This survey presents an overview of the research on ProVerif.

Cite

APA

Blanchet, B. (2016). Modeling and Verifying Security Protocols with the Applied Pi Calculus and ProVerif. Foundations and Trends® in Privacy and Security, 1(1-2), 1-135. https://doi.org/10.1561/3300000004

Vancouver

Blanchet B. Modeling and Verifying Security Protocols with the Applied Pi Calculus and ProVerif. Foundations and Trends® in Privacy and Security. 2016;1(1-2):1-135. doi:10.1561/3300000004

BibTeX
@article{Blanchet2016,
  author = {Blanchet, Bruno},
  title = {Modeling and Verifying Security Protocols with the Applied Pi Calculus and ProVerif},
  journal = {Foundations and Trends® in Privacy and Security},
  year = {2016},
  volume = {1},
  number = {1-2},
  pages = {1--135},
  doi = {10.1561/3300000004}
}
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