Executive Compensation and Deployment of Corporate Resources: Evidence from Working Capital
Review of Corporate Finance · 2021
DOI: 10.1561/114.00000002 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Review of Corporate Finance, 2021. Verfasst von Nihat Aktas und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 5-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 45 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Firms provide compensation incentives to executives, primarily in the form of bonus payments, to alleviate slack in the deployment of corporate resources to working capital. Financially constrained firms are heavy users of working capital incentives. So are firms that are less exposed to external takeover threats. Among the different components of working capital, inventories and payables are the main drivers of executive bonuses. Overall, our evidence supports the optimal contracting view of bonus payments in executive compensation.
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APA
Aktas, N., Croci, E., Ozbas, O., & Petmezas, D. (2021). Executive Compensation and Deployment of Corporate Resources: Evidence from Working Capital. Review of Corporate Finance. https://doi.org/10.1561/114.00000002
Vancouver
Aktas N, Croci E, Ozbas O, Petmezas D. Executive Compensation and Deployment of Corporate Resources: Evidence from Working Capital. Review of Corporate Finance. 2021. doi:10.1561/114.00000002
BibTeX
@article{Aktas2021,
author = {Aktas, Nihat and Croci, Ettore and Ozbas, Oguzhan and Petmezas, Dimitris},
title = {Executive Compensation and Deployment of Corporate Resources: Evidence from Working Capital},
journal = {Review of Corporate Finance},
year = {2021},
doi = {10.1561/114.00000002}
}
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