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Corporate Payout Policy

Harry DeAngelo, Linda DeAngelo, Douglas J. Skinner

Foundations and Trends® in Finance · 2007

DOI: 10.1561/0500000020 ↗

At a glance

Journal article in Foundations and Trends® in Finance, 2007. Written by Harry DeAngelo and 2 co-authors. Cited 221 times so far (Crossref).

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Abstract (original language)

We present a synthesis of academic research on corporate payout policy grounded in the pioneering contributions of Lintner (1956) and Miller and Modigliani (1961). We conclude that a simple asymmetric information framework that emphasizes the need to distribute FCF and that embeds agency costs (as in Jensen (1986)) and security valuation problems (as in Myers and Majluf (1984)) does a good job of explaining the main features of observed payout policies — i.e., the massive size of corporate payouts, their timing and, to a lesser degree, their (dividend versus stock repurchase) form. We also conclude that managerial signaling motives, clientele demands, tax deferral benefits, investors’ behavioral heuristics, and investor sentiment have at best minor influences on payout policy, but that behavioral biases at the managerial level (e.g., over-confidence) and the idiosyncratic preferences of controlling stockholders plausibly have a first-order impact.

Cite

APA

DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L., & Skinner, D. J. (2007). Corporate Payout Policy. Foundations and Trends® in Finance. https://doi.org/10.1561/0500000020

Vancouver

DeAngelo H, DeAngelo L, Skinner DJ. Corporate Payout Policy. Foundations and Trends® in Finance. 2007. doi:10.1561/0500000020

BibTeX
@article{DeAngelo2007,
  author = {DeAngelo, Harry and DeAngelo, Linda and Skinner, Douglas J.},
  title = {Corporate Payout Policy},
  journal = {Foundations and Trends® in Finance},
  year = {2007},
  doi = {10.1561/0500000020}
}
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