Bayesian Mechanism Design
Foundations and Trends® in Theoretical Computer Science · 2013
DOI: 10.1561/0400000045 ↗At a glance
Journal article in Foundations and Trends® in Theoretical Computer Science, 2013. Written by Jason D. Hartline. Cited 30 times so far (Crossref); 94 references.
Abstract (original language)
Systems wherein strategic agents compete for limited resources are ubiquitous: the economy, computer networks, social networks, congestion networks, nature, etc. Assuming the agents' preferences are drawn from a distribution, which is a reasonable assumption for small mechanisms in a large system, Bayesian mechanism design governs the design and analysis of these systems. This article surveys the classical economic theory of Bayesian mechanism design and recent advances from the perspective of algorithms and approximation. Classical economics gives simple characterizations of Bayes-Nash equilibrium and optimal mechanisms when the agents' preferences are linear and single-dimensional. The mechanisms it predicts are often complex and overly dependent on details of the model. Approximation complements this theory and suggests that simple and less-detail-dependent mechanisms can be nearly optimal. Furthermore, techniques from approximation and algorithms can be used to describe good mechanisms beyond the single-dimensional, linear model of agent preferences.
Cite
APA
Hartline, J. D. (2013). Bayesian Mechanism Design. Foundations and Trends® in Theoretical Computer Science. https://doi.org/10.1561/0400000045
Vancouver
Hartline JD. Bayesian Mechanism Design. Foundations and Trends® in Theoretical Computer Science. 2013. doi:10.1561/0400000045
BibTeX
@article{Hartline2013,
author = {Hartline, Jason D.},
title = {Bayesian Mechanism Design},
journal = {Foundations and Trends® in Theoretical Computer Science},
year = {2013},
doi = {10.1561/0400000045}
}
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