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THE MULTITUDE OF PERCEPTUAL BELIEFS PROBLEM

Eben VIKTOR

Epistemological Studies in Philosophy Social and Political Sciences · 29.05.2026 · 9 (1) · 12-19

DOI: 10.15421/342602 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Epistemological Studies in Philosophy Social and Political Sciences, online erschienen am 29.05.2026. Verfasst von Eben VIKTOR. Die Arbeit nennt 19 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Current cognitive philosophical discourse about perceptual belief is focused mainly on the phenomenon of belief arising from perceptual experience and the extent of cognitive conceptual penetration into perception. This article contributes to the debate by highlighting problems that arise from causality as a main premise of the perceptual belief thesis. We investigate the implications of this premise and find it implies a multitude of beliefs would be formed from perceptual experience. This we call the MOB-problem. Defining a perceptual field subsequently helps to analyse the problem in terms of a perceptual processing function. An attempt to save the perceptual belief thesis by postulating stored beliefs is analysed next. Results from cognitive psychology show that belief is not stored in the way folk memory theory would predict; doubts are raised as to whether beliefs are stored at all. Furthermore, by analogy, processes involved in belief retrieval cast doubt on whether the products of perception really are beliefs. The doubt cast by this analysis of the MOB-problem on the premise that perceptual beliefs are directly and immediately caused should have a negative effect on the perceptual belief involuntarism thesis – the view that we have no control over perceptual beliefs – and by implication on the doxastic involuntarism thesis, which states that all our belief acquisition is involuntary.

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APA

VIKTOR, E. (2026). THE MULTITUDE OF PERCEPTUAL BELIEFS PROBLEM. Epistemological Studies in Philosophy Social and Political Sciences, 9(1), 12-19. https://doi.org/10.15421/342602

Vancouver

VIKTOR E. THE MULTITUDE OF PERCEPTUAL BELIEFS PROBLEM. Epistemological Studies in Philosophy Social and Political Sciences. 2026;9(1):12-19. doi:10.15421/342602

BibTeX
@article{VIKTOR2026,
  author = {VIKTOR, Eben},
  title = {THE MULTITUDE OF PERCEPTUAL BELIEFS PROBLEM},
  journal = {Epistemological Studies in Philosophy Social and Political Sciences},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {9},
  number = {1},
  pages = {12--19},
  doi = {10.15421/342602}
}
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