Uniform Price Auction with Quantity Constraints
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics · 02.11.2026 · 26 (2) · 227-242
DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2025-0074 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, online erschienen am 22.05.2026. Verfasst von Kiho Yoon. Die Arbeit nennt 22 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints. We present an iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium outcome. Demand reduction and low price equilibrium may occur since it is advantageous for a bidder to give up some of his/her demand and get the remaining demand at a low price rather than to get his/her entire demand at a higher price. We show that a low price equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium when no bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply.
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APA
Yoon, K. (2026). Uniform Price Auction with Quantity Constraints. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 26(2), 227-242. https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2025-0074
Vancouver
Yoon K. Uniform Price Auction with Quantity Constraints. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. 2026;26(2):227-242. doi:10.1515/bejte-2025-0074
BibTeX
@article{Yoon2026,
author = {Yoon, Kiho},
title = {Uniform Price Auction with Quantity Constraints},
journal = {The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics},
year = {2026},
volume = {26},
number = {2},
pages = {227--242},
doi = {10.1515/bejte-2025-0074}
}
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